The need to link debt guarantees to tricyc1ing*
and uncertainty and high cost of credit for middleincome developing countries (MICs), all require attention;
recycling: if OPEC surpluses are not placed in
Ides to permit extra imports from des (tn-cycling) Ides will cut their purchases of such imports, and will be driven towards costly borrowing, reduced growth, or IMF loans conditional on domestic deflation; then world demand and incomes would fall.
There is widespread agreement on the 'real' issues: food and energy. However, three obstacles frustrate the implementation of Brandt. First is the evasion of the financial issues: debt and recycling. Second is the resultant trapped, stagflationary mode of thinking of some dc politicians and bankers, who come to see extra ide demandwhether out of aid or out of recycled oil surplusesas a source of dc inflation, not of extra real output. Third is the non-involvement of OPEC in post-Brandt analysis and negotiation.
The financial log-jam has to be broken, the seriousness of the risks recognised, and OPEC involved in a twin approach to debt guarantees and surplus placement in ides. Otherwise the world is headed for deep, prolonged recession. The long-run causes of that danger are monetarist contractionism in the financial sphere, andironically, given the free-market pedigree of monetarismthe resulting protectionism, in the realexchange sphere, of nations in recession. The shortrun trigger will be major defaults on ide debt, inducing *This article will also appear in a forthcoming issue (no 84, June 1981) of the Vierteljahresbericlzte, published by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn. Bulletin, 1981. vol 12 no 2. Institute of Development Studies. Sussex cumulative cash contraction by the lending banks.
The worst-damaged victims will be the LICsBangladesh, India, the Sahel. They borrow little from the world's banks and are unlikely themselves to default, but they will suffer grievously from the cumulative contraction of aid and trade if MICs do so.
Hence it is imperative to galvanise or improve upon the diffuse, poorly-articulated systems for implementing Brandt.3 The starting point is the debt threat. Effective consolidation here has to be linked with longer-term recycling. OPEC has to see clear economic benefit from this joint process.
The Problem
Third World debt: the menace of optimism ' The consensual optimism of professional commentators'4 leads them to oppose 'efforts to create new facilities with a view to dealing with a generalised I debt j crisis '.5 As the optimists see it, despite 'prophecies of doom, Yetas the banks recognisepeople who show that they are 'doing their job' by lending, whether in regional offices of the World Bank or in foreign branches of commercial banks, tend towards overoptimism about repayment prospects. This overoptimism even extends to 'sensitivity analysis', of the extra risk of default if various things go wrong. Objective head-office systems to evaluate default risk are not used in some banks; are reviewed against experience in few (where they perform badly); and anyway generate lending criteria that are 'relaxed when I banks need to lend',9 eg when they are awash with OPEC cash.
What reasons, apart from pressure to lend, account for this tilt toward optimism?
The debt service ratio (DSR) (je the borrowers' Many important debts are omitted from these DSRs." Short-term loans (for less than a year) are always left out; few countries report loans to buy arms; and fewer than one in three of the World Bank's sample of 'important' borrowers informs it about private debts that are not publicly guaranteed. The last category alone, at the end of 1977, was estimated to raise MIC long-term and medium-term debt from $149.4 million to $192.6 million, or by 29 per centpresumably concentrated on particularly risky loans, and hence with higher interest-rates, shorter maturities, and thus much greater percentage effect on the DSR'2 than the 29 per cent figure suggests.
It is assumed, after the 1979-80 oil price rises, that OPEC (and therefore the banks) will have lots of loanable cash for ldcs with otherwise dangerously high DSRs. However, such cash will not readily be placed by OPEC with high-risk banks, or by banks, especially newcomers, with high-risk customer countries.
OPEC can leave its oil in the ground, or its cash in gold. Banks can recycle to dcs. Nor can 'swap arrangements' be assumed to funnel cash smoothly towards at-risk banks, especially under stress.
Extrapolation from past non-default at a given DSR is over-hopeful in three ways. First, the proneness of DSRs to shoot up suddenly is not realised. Second, the capacity of each MIC, and of the world financial system ('the market') to handle a given DSR is overstressed, on the basis of 1973-75 experience. Third, the factors 'converting' a given DSR, handled in a particular way, into a repayment crisis are assumed to be more favourable and more stable than they really are. This over-hopeful extrapolation overlooks several points. seldom directly linked to a project's repayment capacity: a public guarantee will doand many loans support consumer imports, or investments that increase profit at the cost of wages (eg tractors that replace ploughmen) or of other firms' profits, rather than raising the recipient nation's GNP and hence repayment capacity.
In a frightening pyramid of musical chairs, each bank expects repayments out Of the borrowing countries' capacity to borrow still more, rather than out of the yield of the purchases financed by itself. Yet countries' ability to borrow more is erratic.
Increased world political instability, and its effects on prices of gold, currencies and oiland on demand for armscan suddenly divert surplus cash away from Table 1 shows the results of cumulated borrowing, and of the over-optimism discussed in the previous section. In Table 2 , various risk factors are shown. This table does not purport to be scientific but it does bring out several points:
that net oil exporters are sometimes at risk, too;
that copper production goes with a high debt/GNP ratio;
-that some very weak DSRs are offset by strong bank positions (but can these be 'mobilised' to meet a debt crisis?) that others are offset by large economies (low ratios of debt service, and of current deficit, to GNP); that some risky DSRs are made riskier by high imports (bad current balances of payments) relative to GNP; that a few MICs, and even some oil exporters, score 'Yes' or 'Almost' in alarmingly many columns.
The nature of a possible debt crisis Too often, the optimists have not been effectively challenged because the crisis has been specified much too vaguely. It is not a 'general crisis of capitalism' in any Marxist sense. It is not that 'the viability of the international monetary system would be undermined ', or that ldcs' 'failure to meet their obligations will trigger an international crisis that will endanger the viability of the international monetary system'.2'
Michalopoulos rightly rejects such blurred images, in which the world falls off an unspecified cliff, or numerous big banks cannot repay depositors.
In the likely crisis scenario, two or three large private debtors among ldcsfaced by dearer oil, depressed export markets, and poor harvests necessitating food imports cannot repay, say, three to five major Western banks. Some $10 bn, which these banks expected to be repaid, is instead formally defaulted, or must be 'rescheduled'. What does a bank, faced with a big cut in its cash base, do? It is easiest to answer the question if we look at it the other way round. By law or by custom, a bank keeps a prudential 'cash ratio', typically 10 per cent, between cash-in-hand and liabilities to depositors. If cash-in-hand rises by $10 mn due to extra deposits, such a bank will raise advances by (100-10) per cent of $10 mn, ie by $9 mn, and keep the extra $1 mn as cash. Most of the extra $9 mnin a dc typically about 80 per centfinds its way as cash deposits into the banks, permitting a second round of extra advances: (100-10) per cent of that 80 per cent of $9 mn or about $6.5 mn. This permits a third round... and so on; in this quite realistic example, a $10 mn cash expansion, for a bank, produces an ultimate credit expansion of $33,3 mn from the banking system. But a 'cash outflow', such as a default on a loan due for repayment, 'puts the credit multiplier into reverse, when it becomes the credit contraction multiplier... Loans are called, investments are liquidated, and deposits contract by a multiple'. 22 The multiplier of only 3.3, in the event of a series of defaults of $10 bn concentrated on loans due to a few banks, is too optimistic, because the affected banks would have to call in even more cash: partly to anticipate panic withdrawals by raising the prudential cash reserve ratio; partly to make good the cash actually lost through such withdrawals; and partly to attract funds by raising interest paid to depositors. A $10 bn cash contraction due to default could lead to reduction in lending by the banking system of up to $50 bn. Not only LICs, but even prime industrial borrowers who had been relying on renewed accommodations, would be at risk. Defaults and bankruptcies would echo, not mainly around banks, but around dc and ldc firms.
It might not in practice be quite that bad. First, the banks could restore part of the depleted cash ratio by selling securities, rather than by cutting advances; but this mainly transfers the cash contraction (to the buyers of securities) rather than eliminating it. Second, swap arrangements among banks could achieve something. Third, OPEC funds could help a little, though they are unlikely to go to banks, or even lender countries, over-exposed in defaulting (or 'rescheduling') Ides; indeed, oil producers, if they lose trust in Western banks as a whole, will be tempted to leave their oil in the ground. Fourth, some banks might borrow from the Central Bank as 'lender of last resort'; but such credit might well be neither sought (due to its high price) nor supplied (because banks would be told to call in risky advances before the Central Bank admitted a 'last resort' was required). Fifth, des might bale out affected banks cheaply, or allow IMF to expand SDRs with similar restorative effect on the credit base; but would either time during a sudden crisis or monetarism permit? In any event, neither central banks nor IMF lend direct to firms, in dcs or in LICs; and it is firms, not banks, that are at most serious risk in this scenario.
All in all, general cures after LIC defaults would do little for these firms, and almost nothing to restore the lending capacity of the particular affected banks.
Even if it was restored, those banks would receive loan cash, corresponding to liabilities, which creates less willingness to re-expand risk lending than does the return of expected unencumbered cash owned by the bank itself. Failure of such return, through default or rescheduling concentrated by a few Ides on a few banks, would have a large cumulative deflationary impact. If we are very optimistic, we could hope that OPEC, swaps, and governmental baling-out would reduce the contractionary effect of $10 bn LIC nonrepayment upon dcs, from the $50 bn suggested above, to (say) $35-$40 bn. it is no longer possible to write off these short-term risks as 'scare scenarios'. What is 'around the corner' in a non-Brandtian world is not catastrophe for all. It is a steady series of deflationary shocks, starting from non-repayments or rescheduling, and multiplied by the effect of eroded cash upon bank lending. The worst sufferers will probably be the poorest developing countries, who borrow little from commercial banks, but partly depend for their precarious levels of living upon exports and concessional capital, which recession erodes.
Solutions, Bogus and Genuine
The problem is both too little credit and too much: too much loaned in search of quick profits at swift maturity and high risk, to a few increasingly overburdened MICs; too little long-term credit, at low but safe real rates of interest, both to reduce risks to MICs and to speed development in LICs. Deflationary treatmentless or harsher creditcould make matters worse. But an expansionary treatment might just pump more air into the unsound credit balloons of some MICs, and is anyway seen by some des as inflationary. Furthermore, some simple expedients (such as retrospective adjustment of terms of aid loans) are either exhausted already, or too weak to help, or palpably unfair. While the shortrun danger has to be tackledby a mixture of guarantees and credit planning that, nevertheless, preserves some freedom of responsible action for borrowers and lenders as well as intermediariesit will recur unless the underlying issue, long-run credit tn-cycling, is tackled also.
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Cutbacks will not do Brandt rightly rejects a 'solution' that simply cuts back on private loans. This might indeed raise the share of 'sound' aid in total debt. However, many private loans do support genuine development. Others are needed to help debtor nations to refinance older debts.
Nor is there a solution by simply expanding most current forms of IMF aid. It is too short-term, too little, and too deflationary in its conditions. The Jamaican case shows this dramatically. The IMF President, M. de Larosière, himself recognises it.
The 'Paris Club' and analogous arrangements have rescheduled private debt about 40 times in 1956-80. However, the Club has several drawbacks. First, it could never defuse a widespread threat of possible defaults, because it acts only if a particular nation's default is almost imminent. Second, the 'Club' is very reluctant to reduce the severity of loan terms (as opposed to extending the repayment period), so that it buys timea worthy aim rather than solving problems at root; more seriously, this severe approach puts more strain on relatively ever-scarcer aid, which can then be represented as paying ides to repay harsh private 'risk' creditors. Above all, the 'Paris Club' normally lends only to ides that accept the IMF's conditions.24
Hence all these three options aloneless 'unsound' private lending, more use of the IMF, the 'Paris Club'drive out the deflationary devil with a perhaps equally deflationary Beelzebub.
Soundness without tears?
Can an alternative be found, enabling Ides in repayment difficultiesoften not their fault but due to oil import prices, depressed export markets, etcto escape without curtailing growth, and especially without unemploying and impoverishing their poorest people?2 (Since capital can move abroad if profits fall, it is likely that 'unemployment and stagnant or declining real wages are more probable' results of ide deflation.2) Can one have either a response, to external debt needs, that mobilises extra domestic supply of tradeable goods (but not equivalent import demand), instead of a response that deflates home demand and hence imports; or else if there must be a contractionist response, one that 'sheds its load' on the better-off instead of penalising mainly the poorest?
For example, could Jamaica and the IMF, in Spring 1980, have agreed on a solution that both enhanced Jamaica's repayment capacity, and allowed the Government to pursue socialist, or otherwise egalitarian and growth-enhancing, policies? 'IMF loans'and the Paris Club 'regularly require economic policies that rest on social and political repression. Today, there are probably no alternative policies that would permit Ides in trouble to balance their external accounts '.27 Yet neither Communist countries nor relatively egalitarian capitalist Ides such as Taiwan have had bad default records.
The imperative -for short-run debt improvement and hence for IMF actionis to analyse and support policies permitting Ides to develop 'sounder' debt positions without savage deflationism and inequality. This imperative is as much political as economic. In the world economy, however, it is needed to prevent the cure for default risks from being as contractionistnot least of dc economies -as the disease. After all, in EEC in 1980, 'there would be 3 mn more unemployed if the non-oil ldcs had cut their manufactured imports to meet the increased oil prices of 1973-74 rather than borrowing'.2" There is a massive Northern interest, as Brandt stresses, in avoiding contractionist knee-jerk responses in debt crises by, and to, the South.
Currently favoured approaches
The deflationary cures to an ides short-run debt crisis can be worse than the disease. No acceptable domestic solution via supply expansion, or deflation of demand confined to the rich, has yet been devised (though I think this is a possible task). Three possible approaches are favoured instead.
The first approach involves aid debt forgiveness. Already 'retrospective terms adjustment' has softened past aid loans to LICs from most des, and already the grant element of new aid is well over 90 per cent. Some progress could be made if the USA accepted terms adjustment, and if Japan raised its grant element.
However, such improvement in aid:
would be small in effect; could be at the expense of more aid; would rightly stress the LICs, not the MICs where the main debt problem lies; could divert aid from ides and dc banks; why should not the risk-takers sometimes lose their own money?
The second approach takes off from this final, somewhat moralistic objection. To avoid bankruptcies, bankers often give 'debt relief. . . out of enlightened selfinterest'.29 Can such specific remedies perhaps be anticipated and generalised? Under a guarantee scheme, both banks and direct OPEC lenders would trade in, say, half their ide credits (not, of course, just bad debts chosen by them!) in return for bonds, guaranteed but bearing much lower interest. Whether the guarantor would be ¡MF, the World Bank, or a mixed or new institution is a secondary but important issue. So is the balance of finance for such a scheme, as between lenders (acting as mutual insurers), borrowers and international organisations.3° In any case, it is an inadequate argument, against such a scheme, to claim that it is a general remedy, whereas crisis threats are particular to countries and general systemic collapse is vague and implausible.-1' As explained, the problem lies in the international transmission of deflation, starting from particular Ide defaults, via particular banks' cash-ratios, to multiple, general credit contractions by banks. The globe does not fall off a cliff; it gradually deflates! Debt guarantee systems can greatly reduce these risks.
The missing link: hi-cycling The third currently-favoured approach involves 'recycling' of OPEC funds towards desor, if to Ides, largely as a way to meet extra oil bills. Neither method suffices to secure the long-term credit base for world expansion.
Straight recycling of OPEC cash to des alone would leave Ides with 'no relief for their massive trade deficits'.
That would compel a 'decline in ide exports to the Ides I and thus imperil I the fragile economic recovery of the West'. Unfinaneed ide deficits 'could also force a moratorium on payment of the outstanding private and official debt by the ides'.72 OPEC recycling to ides, fully matched by increased purchases by ides of OPEC oil, leaves no extra cash to expand ide imports from des. Indeed, it compels contraction of such imports, as interest on OPEC commercial debt builds up. Further, it assumes no attempts by, or for, ides to replace imported fossil fuels. Since ide growth would further expose ail these raw inadequacies of a simple recycling procedure, they render such growth that much less likely.
There are three requirements to restore balance, in a way neither deflationary nor inflationary, to OPEC, dc and Ide trading positions, after oil revenues transferred to OPEC from des and Ides rise sharply:
-to enable OPEC to place its extra cash in sound investments (commercial or concessional) in des and Ides, both to enable them to buy sufficient oil and to permit ides, in early development, to run import surpiuses with des; to enable des to export more to ides and to OPEC, thus converting an almost unmanageable balance-of-payments strain into an easily-manageable small sacrifice (of domestic consumption to production for exports); -to enable ides to run the current-account deficits needed to continue growth -je to expand imports from des, and not to contract rapidly the volume of oilbased importswhile building up the sectors that will eventually produce the exports (or replace the imports) to repay the debts and to eliminate the deficits.
OPEC must therefore be involved in any programme of 'massive transfers' to Ides. Ldcs will have to use substantial parts of those transfers to buy extra dc exports. And des will have to sacrifice some consumption to make those exports, and hence at first to pay for dearer imported oil, but increasingly for the balanceof-payments costs involved in investments in domestic energy conservation, exploration and development. This is tricycling: OPEC funds to ldcs to buy dc exports; the extra dc revenue (from exports to Ides) to maintain, then partly replace, imports of OPEC oil; the Ides' extra OPEC funds, in part, to buy extra goods from des (and in part to service OPEC loans).
The empty chair Tn-cycling and debt guarantees the long-run solution and the shortneed each other. Brandt rightly stresses the gains to des and Ides. But the empty chair, at the post-Brandt discussions, has been that of OPEC. If OPEC is absent, so is the ultimate creditor in a tricycling process, and the party to whom most risky debts are ultimately due.
What would be the costs and benefits to OPEC countries from a Brandt-style settlement? Much the same as to the intermediary banks. They would gain international guarantees against default, financed partly as mutual insurance, partly by new special funds (to be raised, perhaps, by the World Bank). In return, they would lose: some freedom to select objects and customers for lending (clearly loans can be guaranteed only if their quality is controlled); as debt was funded, some of the risk-premium implicit in the former high interest rates; some corresponding power to search out high interest-rates on risky loans.
Given present risks, that seems a good deal for OPEC.
It should also be possible, with such guarantees, to steer much larger shares of OPEC tn-cycling towards the really poor countries of South Asia and Eastern and Central Africa. In any event, many senior civil servants in such countries (notably India) regard 'deflation via default' as their main single international nightmare, and its prevention as their top priority for world financial reform, even thotjgh their own countries are not now and may not be in future major borrowers 50 from private banks. But there will be no remedy unless OPEC fills the empty chair.
There has been some tn-cycling. OPEC's aid, as a First, it is because obvious ways outIMF, the Paris Club, fewer or 'sounder' private loansare thought by some to be sufficient, and realised by others to be insufficient. The former see no need for discussion. Many of the latter see nowhere to go. Second, it is claimed that the massive extra OPEC surpluses of 1979-80, as in 1973-76, can be successfully placed by the banking system. However, this is the same over-aggregative wishful thinking that led to the refusal to recognise a 'debt problem'.3 'OPEC as a whole' may seek to place vast, growing surpluses in 'ides as a whole' through 'the banking system', while particular countries providing major OPEC cash, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, place no new cash in pai-ticular banks seen as over-exposed in particular Ides.
Third, some people argue that discussions of debt crisis will, by reducing 'confidence', cause what they discuss. This assumes that bankers and lenders are unaware of the issues. It is more probable that matters will reach disaster point through neglect than through open analysis.
Inflation or reflation?
The main reason why des have been reluctant to discuss these issues seriously, however, is the fear of renewed inflation as extra ide cash is spent. Many sceptics do not see a shared Western interest in higher Ide purchasing-power. They argue as follows: 'the last thing that monetarist dc governments, terrified of renewed inflations, want is extra monetary demand. Why should they revive the inflationary dragon by throwing dc taxpayers' cash at ldcs, while taking unpopular measures to dry up cash flows at home'?
There are two rejoinders, one 'global' and the other 'local'. Globally, monetarismwhatever its virtues in explaining the rate of inflation in one countiycannot account for world-wide inflation during recession, expecially with floating exchange-rates among main trading currencies. It is more plausible to interpret events since 1973-74, world-wide, as follows. Oil pricerises greatly inflated costs, but deflated domestic demand, in dc and ldc oil-importers. Many also had cost-inflationary transmission systems, allowing noncompeting groups of workers and their employerswith near-monopoly control over coal, or garbage-clearing, or medical servicesto pass on higher prices and costs. Governments, failing to restrain either costpush (by cutting oil imports) or cost-transmission (by controlling, or getting agreement among, monopolists of key forms of labour or of outputs), have desperately responded to real cost-inflation by monetary demanddeflation. While enough of such nasty medicine can work, the patient may die first. Meanwhile, deflation of national demands for non-oil impol-ts transmits recession internationally, stimulating the cry for protection. To the extent that this analysis is rightand only a t'en' dogmatic monetarist would deny it major elements of truthultra-monetarist objections to Brandtian 'Ide reflation' are reminiscent of the man who, having murdered his parents, seeks clemency on the grounds that he is an orphan.37
There is also a 'local' rejoinder. Suppose we accept that genera/ised extra demand for dc products as a whole, while expectations remain inflationary, will generate inflation rather than extra real output, even in recession. Cannot extra ldc demand for a des exports nevertheless induce more real growth, and less inflation, than extra demand from other des or from domestic sources? During recession, some dc sectors suffer much more severe cutbacks than others.
In particular the investment-goods sectors suffer severely.
If recession reduces expected growth of real GNP from four per cent yearly to two per cent, and if each unit of output requires three units of extra capital, then net investment falls from 12 per cent of GNP to six per cent.39 Massive spare capacity in investmentgoods (and to a lesser extent other producer-goods) sectors is thus created, even if all the consumer-goods sectors experience is a gentle slow-down in growth.
Hence extra export demand, if steered to the industries experiencing especially severe recession (steel, machinery, construction), will 'find' many half-idle machines and specialised workers; to re-employ these will not create excess demand for labour (bidding up wage-rates), and may even cut unit production costs.39
There is good reason to expect ide purchases from des, especially out of aid or carefully-supervised bank loans, to be geared much more towards acquisition of investment-goods than is the case for 'any old' extra demand. Hence the balance between induced growth and induced inflation, for des, is likely to be especially favourable if the inducing agent is extra demand from Few forms of reflation have a better prospect of expanding output, rather than price-levels, in des. Pelican, 1971, p94 . This is the famous 'principle of acceleration'. Output of investment-good is not cut by as much as half, partly because replacement investment (and much public investment) are not cut back nearly as rapidly as new private investment. But investment-goods production is cut much more in slump than is consumer-goods production. Spending. out of rises in the investment-goods wagesbill, is also rather less demand-inflationary (and more reflationary of real output) than spending Out of wagebill rises in other sectors. Wage-rates are bid up less in the more heavily-unemployed investment-goods sector. Also, that sector tends to be concentrated in depressed regions where revived demand can call into play consumergoods production that has more spare capacity than in other regions of the economy. 
